

KLJ

OSAGEUR

✓ STRATEGY
✓ BERLIN (FORCES)
✓ MOBILIZATION

18 Oct

OUTGOING MESSAGE
(By Special Means)

LN/dem

✓ INDEX : McNAMARA'S 10 QUEST

16 September 1961
1045 hrs

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO: SECDEF - PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA FROM
GENERAL NORSTAD

INFO: CJCS - PERSONAL FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD

Reference: JCS 1364-61

1. I have studied your proposed answers to the ten questions which will be considered in connection with your recommendations. Our respective reactions to the principal questions posed are conditioned by the basic views we hold, both with respect to future NATO strategy, and to the measures required to meet the current threat. I believe that your paper reflects to a large degree my thoughts on these broader questions. It is in degree rather than in principle that our views may vary. I hope that the answers eventually submitted will contribute to a better understanding of both principle and detail. To this end, I will first outline my views on what I consider to be the basic issues, since these are largely the source of the related specific comments.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case 0250-11-000-71
NLE Case 0250-11-000-75
By bc NLE Databank

2. I fully appreciate and support the need to create a position from which we would be able to respond, within reasonable limits, to any form of Soviet aggression in the NATO area, forcefully, but in such a way as to minimize the risk of general war. I believe, however, that realistic planning must seek to exploit our strengths without overlooking our weaknesses; above all, it must weigh immediate needs against interests of the long-term defense posture of the West. While preparing to exploit any favorable developments, we must avoid convincing ourselves that the possible is probable. We must not confuse the wish with the fact. We should therefore consider, very carefully, our ability to enforce a gradual, controlled development of the battle, and not overestimate the extent to which we can dictate the Soviet response, particularly in a situation where it is unlikely that we would have the initiative. To assume that we could exercise independent, unilateral control over the battle would be as wrong in 1961 as it was wrong in 1953 to speak of "a time and place of our own choosing." ✓

3. Based upon the principle that it is sound practice to be confident in execution but questioning and concerned in planning, I am disturbed with respect to:

a. The alternatives that will, in fact, become available to us by measures that essentially meet force goals previously established by NATO as the minimum required for an effective defense of Europe.

with nuclear support when necessary.

b. What more we can achieve, because of the conventional force build-up envisioned,

d. The impact of the measures which we propose to take on both the short-term and long-term efforts of our Allies.

4. Our force posture should be such as to permit us to respond to the whole range of the Soviet threat.

5.

6. While not wishing to overestimate Soviet capabilities or to underestimate our own, we must recognize that the Soviets may well start with superior forces, will almost certainly have the initiative and would enjoy superiority in conventional air operations from the outset.

7. Lastly, we must keep in mind the fact that our NATO strategy must be generally acceptable to our Allies if they are to have either the will to face up to possible military operations or the

inclination to build up their forces. Unreasonable as such an interpretation would be.

8. I fully endorse the strengthening of our capabilities and our efforts to get our Allies to do likewise. I have always advocated

9. I suggest that you consider the general observations above as comments applicable to all of the questions and answers posed. In addition, there follow a few observations relating directly to specific questions.

QUESTION ONE:

10. Substitute the following for para d: Strengthen the alternatives between inaction and all-out nuclear war.

11. Add the following sentence to the paragraph beginning: "Additionally, it would guard . . ." Reinforcement of NATO's non-nuclear capability would serve to broaden the choice of response, depending on the nature of the attack and the circumstances prevailing at the time.

QUESTION TWO:


12. The following comment pertains to the third paragraph of the answer that begins: "Finally the non-nuclear . . ." My reply to JCS 1103 contained

QUESTION THREE:

13. First paragraph of reply: The positive statement of the capability to defend against a massive conventional attack for a significant period of time without recourse to nuclear weapons depends on a definition of "significant."



14. Paragraph a of the second paragraph:



15. Paragraph b of the second paragraph: Whatever the estimate of our own interdiction capability, the effects must be considered applicable to both sides.

16. Paragraph c of the second paragraph:



17. Paragraph starting: "With regards non-US NATO Air Forces ... " Comment: The number of non-US, conventionally armed, NATO air squadrons in Central Europe is [redacted] as compared with the figure of [redacted]. The estimate of 30 to 60 days logistic support is conditional on extensive logistic reinforcement.

18. The paragraph that starts: "The 31 US FB squadrons ... " Comment: If we are considering ^{only} the present limited B-47 commitment, the assumption that 31 US squadrons can be made available for non-nuclear operations involves risk to the subsequent ACE capability to implement atomic plans, in terms both of delivery and supporting forces.

QUESTION SEVEN:

19. As a general comment on the air battle problem, I suggest that the issue is not only numbers and logistics but more vitally one of survival and subsequent effectiveness.

20. In principle, our ability to carry out basic defense plans and to comply with both NATO and quadripartite guidance in this regard would not be jeopardized, provided the equivalent additional capability is made available in B-47's. I know of no significant uncommitted Allied tactical reserve air forces that we could draw upon. (I know you will forgive me for thinking of how much better our position would be today if we had developed the land-based/mobile MRBM program which was first proposed in 1957.)

QUESTION NINE:

21. See my comment on Question Three. The Soviets are credited with a capability to reinforce at a rate of 4 divisions per day for the first 10 days and 3 a day for the remainder of the first month, although after the

QUESTION TEN:

22.

At the time you were here in July this was roughly defined as the time at which the

decision was taken to deploy the strategic reserve.

23. With reference to General Lemnitzer's remarks, my general comments apply.

24. Where divergence of views appears to exist, in most cases it springs from differing estimates as to the extent of the benefits to be derived from the planned increases in military strength, national and NATO, and of the degree of dependence we are warranted in placing on these benefits.

I have advocated such strengthening of our capability for at least five years. I specifically endorse the early deployment of the planned 40,000 U. S. troop augmentation in Europe, the proposed increase in U. S. strategic reserve capabilities and the development of suitable means to deploy rapidly these reserve forces.

25. In the light of the situation existing today, I would suggest no further deployment to Europe until we have been able to absorb effectively the: Should the political or military situation change, as it might well do over any 24-hour period, the initial overseas deployments should be made on an exercise basis, several of which have been planned. In this way, a substantial build-up could be achieved without freezing us in a "for the duration" position

so destructive of military and political flexibility. In case of very serious deterioration, these forces should be moved as rapidly as possible.

26. I look forward to discussing this and other subjects with you some time later in the month, as you have suggested. You will appreciate that at the present time it is rather difficult for me to make a firm date. In the meantime, I hope that the substance of this message will be useful to you.